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Executive Summary 
This study examines the question of whether demographic age structure is deflationary. It was 
funded by a grant from the Society of Actuaries (SOA) and prepared by a team of researchers at 
the University of Waterloo and the University of Kent (United Kingdom).  
The report has four main components. We examine the literature and conclude that various 
researchers provide support that age structure may be inflationary or disinflationary; although few 
conclude that it is deflationary. We investigate two recent papers that reach the opposite conclusion 
regarding whether the older age group is deflationary or inflationary, despite using similar data. 
We reconcile this difference but then extend the data set to provide further analysis. We conclude 
that there is strong evidence that the very old age group is deflationary. This finding has significant 
implications for economics, asset returns, actuarial assumptions and policy. 
We also analyze whether there is a relationship among six economic variables that provides 
support for the contention that demographic age structure impacts inflation. We fit a Vector Auto 
Regressive model to avoid having to specify in advance a structural model. This is a useful 
methodology given that there are many possible interactions among the variables across time and 
the difficulty in getting consistent data by country and across countries over long time periods. We 
use the fitted model to suggest the impact of demographic age structure on inflation in a subsequent 
ten year period. 
This study is important for actuaries. It provides clear evidence that demographic age 
structure impacts inflation and for the very old age group is deflationary. The extent of such 
impacts and whether it has inflationary and deflationary effects on all or most asset classes is 
beyond the scope of this research, but worthy of further investigation. Given the methodological 
and data issues associated with such research and that populations in developed countries and 
many other countries are aging, it is important that this investigation continue. 
1 Introduction 
In most countries in the developed world and also in a number of other countries, the population 
is aging. What impact will a changing demographic structure have, if any, on economic factors 
such as growth and inflation? This question is of vital importance to actuaries who use 
demographic and economic projections in the pricing and valuation of products, design of risk 
management solutions, and in opinions regarding the sustainability of social programs. This 
research report, funded by the Society of Actuaries (SOA), provides background on research in 
this area and offers insights that may be of use to practicing actuaries. 
Our work began with a review of relevant literature, some of which is referred to in the 
body of this report. The balance of the work during this study involved analyzing historical data, 
as described in this final report. In this report we embark on the task of systematically examining 
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the potential impact of demographic (or age) structure, in particular, the proportion of older 
population, on inflation. We examine the link between population aging and inflation using panel 
regressions involving 22 countries over a 56 year period (1955-2010). We also use a reduced-form 
panel-data Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology to capture dynamic interactions among the 
main macroeconomic variables without having to take an explicit stand on exogeneity.  
The world population has experienced a drastic shift in terms of both size and composition 
LQWKHSDVWIHZGHFDGHV8VLQJGDWDIURPWKH81¶V:RUOG3RSXODWLRQ3URVSHFWVFigure 1 
depicts the (unweighted) mean proportions of three age cohorts (the Young 0-19, Working Age 
20-64, and the Old 65+) across 22 OECD countries, by year (1955-2010). The average proportion 
of the Old group increased from 9% in 1955 to 16% in 2010, with most of the decline in share 
occurring in the Young group. The proportion of the population in the Working Age group 
increased from 57% in 1955 to 60% in 1993, and remained level thereafter. 
Currently, several aging countries are also experiencing historically low inflation or even 
deflation. Recently, central bankers and researchers at policy institutions have suggested that there 
is a connection between low inflation and population aging.1 Given the projected global aging, it 
is important to understand this link (if it exists), since it may have significant implications for 
actuarial practice. In Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4, we plot the cumulative inflation versus the 
average shares of the Young 0-19, Working Age 20-64, and the Old 65+, respectively, over the 
period 1955 ± 2010 for our sample of 22 countries.  The plots do not offer clear guidance about 
the cross-country direction of the relationship between inflation and demographic changes. 
Considering the regression lines in the graph are highly sensitive to outliers, it is apparent that we 
need to control for other factors that influence inflation in order to understand the role of 
demographics in increasing or decreasing it. 
In this report, we first report the results of static panel-data regressions of inflation on a 
range of explanatory variables including the age structure. Two recent papers have studied the 
impacts of an aging population on inflation using static panel regressions, albeit with contradictory 
conclusions.  While Yoon et al. (2014), hereafter YKL2014, conclude that the impact of the older 
age group is deflationary, Juselius and Takáts (2015), hereafter JT2015, conclude that its impact 
is inflationary. We provide an analysis of these two papers to validate our empirical approach and 
to reconcile their findings. 
The two papers use somewhat similar data for many of the same countries for similar time 
periods, but they do use different methodologies. We have not been able to obtain access to all of 
the data used in the two papers, so we are not able to replicate fully the results. However, we 
believe that the data to which we have access for the time periods that it is available is sufficient 
to provide insight into the differences in the conclusions of the two papers. 
                                                        
1
 See Shirakawa (2011a, 2011b, 2012 and 2013), Bullard et al. (2012), Anderson et al. (2014), Imam (2013) among 
others. 
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Our analysis suggests that the approach used by JT2015 may be the more relevant of the 
two for our purpose. However, with regard to their conclusions about the effect of the older age 
groups on inflation, we note that JT2015 include some reservations regarding the stability of their 
results in the tails of the distribution. Indeed, the 65 and up age group could form quite a large tail 
and there may be differences in results within subgroups within that tail group. 
We conducted several further investigations using panel regressions. In the first, we 
investigated two distinct sub-periods, the first up to 1980 and the second during 1981 ± 2010.  A 
typical time trend of inflation among the OECD countries is that inflation rose in the late 1960s, 
after the late 1970s peak it gradually declined and stayed relatively low in the 1990s and thereafter. 
For the earlier sub-period, we found that the result for the older population is not statistically 
significant. This suggests that, before 1980s, inflation was mainly driven by factors such as oil 
price shocks and easy-money policies adopted in central banks, rather than by demographic 
changes. By contrast, in the 1981-2010 sub-period, we found demographic changes played an 
important role and older age groups exert significant negative impacts on inflation.  
Secondly, following a suggestion of James Bridgeman of the POG, we performed a similar 
analysis, but rather than use cross-country data, we considered the eight Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) economic regions within the U.S. One advantage of this data is that it contains a 
more detailed breakdown of the older age groups in which we are interested. We found that during 
1978 ± 2010, older (80-FRKRUWV¶HIfect on inflation is significantly negative. This was also 
true for the OECD panel data for the same period. 
Finally, we also investigated the OECD data for a shorter sub-period, 1990-2010, for which 
more age groupings in the older tail are available. We again found that the relationship at older 
ages is strongly deflationary. We expect that JT2015 obtained their conclusions because they 
aggregated the two sub-periods and had aggregated age groupings for the old. Hence, it is our view 
that if we are examining the impact of the older-old, it is deflationary.  
Further, we also present an alternative analysis using a panel VAR estimated on data from 
twenty countries over the period 1999-2010. The short period is due to limited data availability for 
our variables of interest, and also due to structural changes in the time series of some of these 
variables that would make a VAR unstable. By using the VAR, we try to determine how much of 
the variation in inflation can be explained by the evolution of the demographic structure, when 
allowance is made for interactions among leading macroeconomic variables, such as growth, 
savings, investment, aggregate labor supply, and interest rates.  
We find that the changing age profile across selected countries has an economically and 
statistically significant impact on leading macroeconomic variables, both in the long and short-run 
after controlling for oil prices. The changing age profile impact approximately follows a life-cycle 
pattern; that is, dependent cohorts in general have a negative impact on real macroeconomic 
variables. However, in contrast to our findings in panel regression studies, the old group adds 
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slightly positive inflationary pressures in the long-run. Coarse demographic groups and short 
period of data may cause this result. 
The remaining parts of this report are organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a 
selected review of literature. In Section 3, we conduct analysis on YKL2014 and JT2015 in the 
first two subsections, respectively. We also provide discussion of a technical reason that may cause 
their contrasting conclusion in Section 3.3. Then, in Section 4, we provide several further 
investigations, including analyses on the OECD panel with different sub-periods, on the U.S. 
economic regions, and on the OECD panel with more age groupings in the older tail. In Section 5, 
we provide further analysis using the reduced form panel-data VAR. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
and identifies areas for future research. The supporting tables and figures are included in the 
Appendix. 
2 Selected Literature Review 
In this section, we discuss the literature on the effects of demography, in particular the age structure 
of the population, on economic growth, inflation/deflation, and other leading macroeconomic 
variables. 
Evidence of the economic significance of the impact of the age structure on the economy 
has not been clear cut. On the one hand, theoretical macroeconomic models, which are typically 
calibrated on the age profile of savings, have highlighted the importance of demographic structure, 
as have many commentaries on economic policy. On the other hand, the econometric evidence 
assembled for its importance has been seen to be less compelling. There are a number of reasons 
for this.  
In particular, most of the changes in demographic structure have occurred at low 
frequencies. This renders it difficult to distinguish the impact of demographic structure from the 
other low frequency trends that typically dominate economic time series. In addition, the vector of 
proportions in each age group is also inevitably highly collinear, making precise estimation of the 
effect of each age group a difficult, if not impossible, task. Faced with these difficulties, it has 
become a common practice in this literature simply to impose strong restrictions on the effect of 
the demographic structure, for instance, through the use of a single proxy, known as the 
dependency ratio. 
The aggregate real GDP growth is affected by demographic structure in a somewhat 
straightforward way. For example, Feyrer (2007) considers the age structure of the workforce, 
instead of the population as a whole, and its impact on productivity and hence output. The author 
reports a strong demographic effect, with the 40-50 year age group having the most positive impact 
on aggregate GDP growth. 
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The impact on per capita real GDP is not so straightforward and thus has been studied 
extensively. Lindh and Malmberg (1999) consider age structure in a transitional growth regression 
on a panel of 5-year periods in OECD countries. Their evidence indicates that age structure as a 
whole does have both a statistically and economically significant impact on per capita growth. 
Also the shares of upper middle-aged people (50 ± 64 years) has a positive influence, and the group 
above 65 contributes negatively. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) study a large panel of 75 countries 
and argue that the increases in life expectancy (and the associated increases and aging in 
population) appear to have reduced income per capita. Using a large cross-country panel spanning 
the past fifty years, Gomez and Hernandez de Cos (2008) present evidence that suggests that the 
SURSRUWLRQV RI µPDWXUH¶ (15- \HDU ROGV DQG µSULPH DJH¶ -54 year olds) people in the 
population can explain more than half of global growth since 1960. Bloom et al. (2007) find that 
inclusion of life expectancy and the initial working-age share in their model improves per capita 
income growth forecast performance for the period of 1980-2000 for a large panel of 67 economies. 
See also Bloom et al. (2010), and references therein. 
 Moreover, Jaimovich and Siu (2009) study the effect of demography on business cycle 
volatility in the G7 countries and find that the young and old workforce have more volatile hours 
and employment than the prime-age workforce. As a result, an increasing share of prime-age 
workforce may have contributed to the great moderation.  
Changes in demographic structure also influence per capita GDP growth. Chapter 3 of the 
2004 World Economic Outlook by Callen et al. (2004) found that per capita GDP growth is 
positively correlated with changes in the working age population share, but is negatively correlated 
with changes in the elderly share. By adapting a demographic polynomial curve-fitting technique 
on a panel covering 22 countries, Arnott and Chaves (2011) get statistically significant conclusions 
to confirm the above relationships, in terms of both levels and changes in shares of population 
cohorts. 
In addition to examining this empirical evidence, many studies incorporate demographic 
features into economic models to investigate future paths of important macro variables. The effect 
of demography on leading macroeconomic variables is usually hypothesized to have arisen from 
life cycle effects on savings and from differences in productivity, because different age groups 
tend to have different participation rates and different human capital. A standard representative-
agent macroeconomic model is not very helpful in this respect because it, by its very construction, 
precludes the existence of such effects. Even overlapping generations models allow for these 
effects only in a highly restricted way - see, for instance, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1992). Miles 
(1999) highlights the advantages and disadvantages of using different types of evidence to assess 
the impact of demographic changes and argues for the use of calibrated general equilibrium models. 
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McMorrow and Roeger (1999) use the QUEST II model2 to make projections through 2050 
IRUWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\¶V0HPEHU6WDWHVFRXQWULHVWKH8.S. and Japan. Their simulation 
scenarios suggest that there could be a cumulative GDP loss over the 50 year period of 20%, 10%, 
and 21% for the EU, U.S., and Japan respectively. Konishi and Ueda (2013) explore the 
macroeconomic impact of population aging using a full-fledged overlapping generation model. 
They fiQGWKDW-DSDQ¶VSRSXODWLRQDJLQJDVDZKROHDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWV*13JURZWKE\GDPSHQLQJ
factor inputs. Their simulations predict that the adverse effects will expand during the next few 
decades.  
Given the plentiful evidence of an ROGHU DJH VWUXFWXUH¶V QHJDWLYH LPSDFW RQ HFRQRPLF
growth, it is reasonable to observe that an economy with an aging population, when accompanied 
by high debt and low employment, may be an environment that has a tendency to have low inflation 
or even deflation. 
Recently, Yoon et al. (2014) and Juselius and Takáts (2015) study the effect of 
demographic changes on inflation using post-war panel data of developed countries. Their results, 
however, are mixed. On the one hand, using a panel dataset covering 30 OECD economies for the 
period 1960-2013, Yoon et al. (2014) find that population growth is inflationary, while aging is 
significantly deflationary. They argue that these observations are probably because of the fact that 
aggregate supply adjusts at a slower pace than aggregate demand in responding to demographic 
shocks in the short or medium run. On the other hand, looking at a similar panel of 22 OECD 
countries from 1955 ± 2010, Juselius and Takáts (2015) find that aging is inflationary rather than 
deflationary. That is, a larger share of dependents (both young and old) is correlated with higher 
inflation, whereas having more working population leads to lower inflation. They explain that 
dependents could exert an inflationary pressure through excess demand because they consume 
more goods and services than they produce, while the working population could lead to a 
deflationary bias because of excess supply. 
Japan has the most rapidly aging population in the world and experienced persistent 
deflation over the past two decades. Various channels through which demographic changes affect 
inflation in Japan have been examined in the past few years. Using a deterministic life-cycle 
economic model with capital, Bullard et al. (2012) find that the optimal inflation rates suggest that 
aging population structures like those in Japan may contribute to observed low rates of inflation 
or even deflation. Katagiri (2012) investigates the effects of changes in demand structure caused 
by population aging on the Japanese economy using a multi-sector Keynesian model with job 
creation/destruction. He finds that such demand shocks caused around 0.3 percentage point 
deflationary pressure on year-to-year inflation from the early 1990s to the 2000s in Japan. More 
                                                        
2
 The QUEST II model is a general equilibrium macro model with a broad geographical coverage. Such models can 
avoid problems in estimating the effects of aging to which partial equilibrium models are prone. 
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important, Katagiri (2012) shows that the repetition of such upward revisions made those effects 
look more persistent. 
Based on simulation of a calibrated IMF Global Integrated Fiscal and Monetary (GIMF) 
model, Anderson et al. (2014) find that substantial deflationary pressures arise from population 
aging, mainly from declining growth and falling land prices. Moreover, the repatriation of foreign 
assets by the elderly leads to real exchange rate appreciation, which exerts downward pressure on 
inflation because of increased demand for relatively cheaper foreign goods and services3. By 
embedding the fiscal theory of the price level4 into an OLG model, Katagiri et al. (2014) find that 
the effects of aging depend on its causes. Aging is deflationary when caused by an increase in 
longevity but inflationary when caused by a decline in birth rate. In the case of Japan, they believe 
it is unexpected longevity, not simply aging, that has led to deflation. 
In addition to economic growth and inflation, there is also a large literature on 
GHPRJUDSK\¶VLPSDFWVRQ other macro variables as well. An early study by Fair and Dominguez 
(1991) examines the effect of demographics on various U.S. macro variables. They discuss the 
aggregation issues and use a low order polynomial function for the coefficients of the vector of 55 
age distribution shares. They report a significant impact of U.S. age distribution on consumption, 
money demand, housing investment and labor force participation. 
Savings rate is one of the most important factors that affects the macro economy, e.g. 
through the capital accumulation channel. Thus, the savings behavior of age cohorts is quite 
relevant and attracts attention for analysis. For example, Higgins and Williamson (1997) study the 
dependency hypothesis for Asia and argue that the large increase in the Asian savings rates is 
attributed to the significant decline in youth dependency ratios. These ratios, in turn, are shown to 
be associated with increased investment and reduced foreign capital dependency. In a subsequent 
study, Higgins (1998) shows that demographic effects, e.g. increases in both youth and old-age 
dependency ratios, can explain different levels of decline in savings and investments and increase 
in capital imports. Using a panel VAR model, Kim and Lee (2008) find that an increase in the 
dependency rate significantly lowers savings rates, especially public saving rates, in the major 
advanced (G-7) countries. Further, a higher dependency rate significantly worsens current account 
balances. 
The link between changing demographic structure and return of assets has been widely 
studied. Poterba (2001) finds that it is difficult to find a robust relationship between asset returns 
on stocks, bonds, or bills, and the age structure of the U.S. population over the last seventy years 
of the twentieth century. In contrast, Davis and Li (2003) explore the relationship between 
                                                        
3
 There is a considerable increase in the proportion of imported foreign goods in domestic consumption in Japan over 
the last decade. According to World Bank national account data, this ratio was 9.8% in 2001 and continuously 
increased to 19.0% in 2013. 
4
 Fiscal theory of the price level states that the government will reduce the impact of its (debt) obligations of an 
unsustainable policy through inflation. 
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demographics and aggregate financial asset prices in 7 OECD countries over the period 1950 to 
2000 and make projections through 2025. They find that an increase in the fraction of middle-aged 
people (aged 40 ± 64) tends to boost real asset prices and a subsequent decline in this cohort, such 
as due to the aging of the baby boom, will tend to weaken them. Park (2010) finds that there is a 
significant impact from prime working-age consumers on the stock price, and that this impact is 
robust for all G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S.). Arnott and Chaves 
(2011) also find that changes in the older age cohort are forecast to lead to higher excess bond 
returns. In addition, there is an extensive literature regarding the impact of the baby boom on asset 
prices, which is summarized in Andrews et al. (2014) and not repeated here.   
3 Panel Regression 
The purpose of this section is to present our analysis of the two papers, Yoon et al. (2014) and 
Juselius and Takáts (2015), with respect to a topic on which they have contrasting conclusions that 
is directly relevant to our research. A detailed analysis of the two papers is organized follows. We 
first describe the analysis of results in YKL2014 and JT2015, respectively. Then we discuss the 
possible reasons that may cause the opposite conclusions in these two papers.  
3.1 Analysis of YKL2014 
3.1.1 Data 
YKL2014 construct most of the relevant variables by compiling data from the internal version of 
,0)¶V:RUOG(FRQRPLF2XWORRN:(2GDWDEDVHZKLFKLVUHVHUYHGIRU,0)¶VVWDII. WEO only 
publishes part of the database on the external webpage, i.e. no data prior to 1980, fewer variables. 
To attempt to replicate their results, we constructed the series by collecting data from other sources, 
ZKLFKPD\FRYHUGLIIHUHQWWLPHSHULRGVDQGHYHQKDYHGLIIHUHQWVHULHV¶GHILQLWLRQV 
3.1.2   Comparison 
The panel-regression model in YKL2014 is the following 
 D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?௜ ൅ D?D?D?D?D?௜௧ ൅ D?௜௧ ൅ D?௜௧ Ǥ [1] 
where D? is the inflation, which is detrended using a quadratic filter. D?଴ is a constant and D?௜ is the 
country-specific fixed effect. D?D?D?D? are relevant measures of demographic structures of individual 
countries, including detrended population growth, share of working age and old, and life 
expectancy. D? is a set of control variables, including terms of trade, real GDP growth, M2 growth, 
and change in budget balance/GDP. D?௜௧ is the error term. Subscripts D? and D? denote the country and 
the time period, respectively.  
The comparison between our panel regression estimations and those in YKL2014 is 
reported in Table 1 and Table 2, using the five models defined in YKL2014. For each model, there 
are three columns. The first column represents the figures taken directly from the paper. The 
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second column lists the estimates of our panel regression. In the third column, figures are from the 
panel regression with non-detrended inflation and population growth.  
It is important to note the following differences. First of all, the number of observations is 
much smaller in our regressions than in theirs, 650 versus 1167. Moreover, 3 countries are 
excluded from the panel-regression due to lack of data. Secondly, for our panel-regression (second 
column in each case), even though the coefficients of the  variable of interest (share of old) have 
the same (negative) signs and magnitudes as those in YKL2014, they are not statistically 
significant  in models (2), (3) and (4). When life expectancy is introduced, model (5) replicates 
<./¶VHVWLPDWRUreasonably well. Thirdly, if we use non-detrended inflation as the dependent 
variable (third columns), the coefficients on the share of old become significant but have larger 
magnitudes in models (2), (3) and (4). Again, model (5) is a better replication. Finally, in contrast 
to the original paper, most of the estimators on control variables are insignificant in our panel 
estimations, possibly due to the smaller sample size.  
3.2 Analysis of JT2015 
3.2.1 Data 
JT2015 use data from multiple sources, including Datastream, Global Financial Data (GFD), 
Consensus Forecasts (CF), OECD, IMF WEO, national data, etc. We have access to most of these 
sources, except GFD and CF. We have collected data for the benchmark model, including inflation, 
demographic measures, output gaps, and nominal interest rate. We would say there is no big 
distinction between our database and theirs. The only exception is for the nominal interest rate 
(nominal overnight inter-bank rate). In their paper, the data on the overnight inter-bank rate has 
full coverage for all 22 countries, i.e. from 1955 to 2010. However, after investigating various on-
line data sources5 for the nominal rate, we were unable to build up the series with full coverage. 
Thus, we have a smaller number of observations on the interest rate (1023), compared to theirs 
(1232). 
3.2.2 Comparison 
JT2015 present results for a number of models. For ease of comparison we only present results for 
some of their models including the benchmark model6, which is model 10 in their paper. The 
benchmark panel regression model in JT2015 uses fourth order polynomials7, and is written as 
 D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?௜ ൅ ෍ D?௣D?෤௣௜௧௉௣ୀଵ ൅ D?ଵD?௜௧ ൅ D?ଶD?ො௜௧ ൅ D?ଷD?  ?൅ D?ସD?  ?൅ D?௜௧ Ǥ [2] 
                                                        
5
 All data sources used in JT2015 were checked. Even though we have no access to the actual data in GFD, we can 
still browse series information there. Other possible sources were also investigated, such as FRED St. Louis, World 
Development Indicators. 
6
 Only selected models are reported in this report. Estimates of other models (those with time effects) are available 
upon request. 
7
 See Fair and Dominguez (1991), Higgins (1998), and Arnott and Chaves (2012) for details. 
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where D? is the yearly inflation rate. D?଴ is a constant and D?௜ is the country-specific fixed effect. D?෤௣௜௧ 
are fourth order population polynomials, which are used to overcome the estimation problems 
associated with direct use of age cohorts. Once estimates of the D?௣  have been obtained, the 
corresponding coefficients on age cohorts can be directly computed. D?௜௧ and D?ො௜௧ are real interest 
rates and output gaps respectively. D?  ? and D?  ? are two dummy variables that account for the 
impact of the two oil crises in the 1970s. Subscripts D? and D? denote the country and the time period, 
respectively. In model (1), (2), (3) and (4) in JT2015, instead of using population polynomials as 
is the case for the benchmark model, they use dependency ratio, shares of the young, the working 
population and the old as the measures of demography. We follow this approach. 
The comparison between our panel regression estimations and those in JT2015 is reported 
in Table 3 and Table 4. For each model, there are three columns. The first column represents the 
figures taken directly from JT2015. The second column lists the estimates of our panel regression. 
Finally, we enhanced the dataset by including eight more OECD countries that were used in 
YKL2014 and report these estimates in the third column. 
Since there is no big difference between our panel and theirs, we would expect our 
estimates of the panel-regression to be similar to those in JT2015. This is true for all models, in 
terms of signs, significance, and magnitudes. Figure 5 shows that our estimation reconciles their 
finding that the impact of each age cohort on inflation exhibits a ³U-shaped relationship´: the 
young and the old age cohorts have a positive impact on inflation, whereas the working age 
population has a negative effect. Moreover, Figure 6 depicts similar patterns for regressions 
without any control variable, i.e. Model (5). In addition, Figure 7 illustrates that Japan has a very 
different age cohort pattern: the young exert an inflationary pressure, the working population are 
slightly inflationary, and the old is quite deflationary. Finally, including more countries does not 
qualitatively change the results. 
3.3 Why different conclusions? 
In this subsection, we investigate why these two papers conclude so differently on the impact of 
aging on inflation.  
3.3.1 Data 
The datasets used in these two papers are similar in terms of country groups and time periods, but 
are very different in terms of control variables. Moreover, there are also differences in the 
definition of demographic variables. For example, YKL2014 define the share of working 
population to cover 15 ± 64 age cohorts, while JT2015 define workers to be those who are in the 
20 ± 64 age cohorts. It is definitely reasonable to believe that different datasets lead to different 
results. To test this, we constructed new datasets by combining the two used in both analyses. Then 
respective regressions were conducted to see if coincident conclusions are achieved.  
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Table 5 reports the regression results on two new datasets: one with 22 OECD countries as 
in JT2015 and the other with 30 OECD countries as in YKL2014. Both cover the period from 1960 
to 2010. Note that we do not include any control variable in these regressions. 
For each dataset, four models are regressed. The first two models use the share of working 
SRSXODWLRQIROORZLQJ<./ZKLOHWKHODVWWZRIROORZ-7¶VGHILQLWLRQ7KHRGGQXPEHU
models take the specification, Equation [3], and the even number models use the specification, 
Equation [4], shown below in sub-section 3.3.2. Note that the significance of the coefficients 
decreases and the goodness of fit drops when eight more countries are included. Thus, our 
following discussion focuses on the former dataset, i.e. model (1), (2), (3) and (4) with 22 OECD 
countries. 
<./¶VUHVXOWVVLJQLILFDQWO\QHJDWive coefficient on the share of old) are robust for the 
QHZFRXQWU\GDWDVHW PRGHODQGIRU-7¶VGHILQLWLRQRISRSXODWLRQVKDUHV PRGHO
6LPLODUO\-7¶VUHVXOWVVLJQLILFDQWO\SRVLWLYHFRHIILFLHQWVRQVKDUHVRIWKH\RXQJDQGWKHROG
are also robust to inclusion of more data7KXVWKHVHWZRSDSHUV¶RSSRVLWHFRQFOXVLRQVVHHPWREH
not caused by the distinctions in their datasets.  
3.3.2 Technical issues 
We would say it may be the following technical difference that causes their opposite conclusions. 
YKL2014 use population growth, share of working age and old, and life expectancy as explanatory 
variables, while JT2015 mainly rely on population polynomials. Nevertheless, we can still make a 
comparison based on the following two similar panel-regressions. 
 D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ൅ D?௜ ൅ D?ଵD?௜௧௪௢௥௞ ൅ D?ଶD?௜௧௢௟ௗ ൅ D?௜௧ ǡ [3] 
 D?௜௧ ൌ D?௜ ൅ D?ଵD?௜௧௬௢௨௡௚ ൅ D?ଶD?௜௧௪௢௥௞ ൅ D?ଷD?௜௧௢௟ௗ ൅ D?௜௧ Ǥ [4] 
where D?௜௧௬௢௨௡௚, D?௜௧௪௢௥௞, and D?௜௧௢௟ௗ are the shares of young, working age and old, respectively. Again, D?଴ is a constant and D?௜ is the country-specific fixed effect. Equation [3] corresponds to model (3) 
in YKL2014, while Equation [4] corresponds to model (3) in JT2015. Note that there is no constant 
in Equation [4] because the three population shares sum to one. Let us see the coefficients on D?௜௧௢௟ௗ. 
Interestingly, as illustrated in columns labeled with (3) and (4) in Table 5, D?ଶ has the value -0.18 
which is significantly negative as in YKL2014, while D?ଷ has the value 0.24 which is significantly 
positive as in JT2015. In other words, everything else being the same, the above two specifications 
predict opposite directions for the impact of aging on inflation. However, this does not mean there 
is inconsistency in the estimates between Equation [3] and Equation [4]. To see this, rearrange 
Equation [3] to the following.  
 D?௜௧ ൌ D?଴ ? ? ?ሺD?௜௧௬௢௨௡௚ ൅ D?௜௧௪௢௥௞ ൅ D?௜௧௢௟ௗሻ ൅ D?௜ ൅ D?ଵD?௜௧௪௢௥௞ ൅ D?ଶD?௜௧௢௟ௗ ൅ D?௜௧ ǡ [3¶] 
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 D?௜௧ ൌ D?௜ ൅ D?଴ ? ? ?D?௜௧௬௢௨௡௚ ൅ ቀ D?଴ ? ? ?൅ D?ଵቁ D?௜௧௪௢௥௞ ൅ ሺ D?଴ ? ? ?൅ D?ଶሻD?௜௧௢௟ௗ ൅ D?௜௧ Ǥ [3¶¶] 
given D?௜௧௬௢௨௡௚ ൅ D?௜௧௪௢௥௞ ൅ D?௜௧௢௟ௗ ൌ  ? ? ? (percentage). The Equation [3¶¶@ H[DFWO\ FRUUHVSRQGV WR
Equation [4], i.e.Ʌଵ ൌ ఓబଵ଴଴, Ʌଶ ൌ ఓబଵ଴଴ ൅ Ⱦଵ, and Ʌଷ ൌ ఓబଵ଴଴ ൅ Ⱦଶ. The figures in column (3) and (4) 
in Table 5 confirm these relationships. Now, it seems to us that YKL2014 conclude that aging is 
deflationary because of the negative coefficient on D?௜௧௢௟ௗ  following regression (3). In contrast, 
JT2015 follow regression (4) to conclude that aging is inflationary. We would say JT2015 deliver 
WKH³WUXH´LQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHRYHUDOOLPSDFWRIWKHROGRQLQIODWLRQ  
In addition, one interesting observation appears. Even though both the young and the old 
impact inflation positively, the old is less inflationary than the young, i.e.  ? ൏ D?ଷ ൏ Ʌଵ. We may 
connect this observation to the literature. First, as explained in JT2015, dependents (both young 
and old) could exert an inflationary pressure through excess demand because they consume more 
goods and services than they produce. Second, the old may exert a deflationary pressure because 
of either political reasons (Katagiri et al. (2014)) or economic reasons (Anderson et al. (2014)). At 
this point, it seems that the first effect dominates, i.e. the overall impact of the old on the inflation 
is positive. The second effect, however, makes the old less inflationary than the young. 
4 Further Analysis 
In this section, we first examine the relationship between age and inflation in two different sub-
periods of the OECD panel. In the second subsection, we conduct analysis using data on the U.S. 
economic regions and make comparisons with the results from OECD panel regressions. Finally, 
we analyze the age impact on inflation for the old population using more refined demographic data 
from 1990. 
4.1 Analysis on the OECD panel with different sub-periods 
In this subsection, we explicitly examine the age patterns on inflation for the OECD panel with 
various sub-periods, including those years before and after 1980. Figure 8 shows the results. The 
green and dark blue curves are derived from the panel regressions over the sub-period 1955 ± 1979 
and the sub-period 1980-2010, respectively.  
Compared with the full period benchmark model (the light blue dotted line), in the sub-
period 1955 ± 1979, the young is more deflationary but the old is much more inflationary. However, 
the coefficients are all insignificant over this sub-period. A possible reason for the insignificancy 
is that before the 1980s, inflation was mainly driven by factors such as oil price shocks and easy-
money policies adopted in central banks, rather than by demographic changes. By contrast, in the 
sub-period 1980 ± 2010, demographic structure has significant impacts on inflation. Young exert 
positive pressure on inflation, while the old is strongly deflationary.  
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4.2 Analysis on the U.S. economic regions 
4.2.1 Data 
We use data on states of the U.S. as the building blocks to construct the panel. The panel covers 
eight economic regions defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)8. For these economic 
regions, annual series for nominal and real regional Gross Regional Product (GRP) are available 
from BEA over the period 1978 ± 2010. From real and nominal GRP we can derive a regional 
GRP-deflator. Regional inflation is measured as the percentage change from the previous year of 
the regional GRP-deflator.9 We then construct a measure for the output gap by using the deviations 
in real GRP from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend10. As for the interest rate, all regions share the 
same real interest rate over the period 1978 ± 2010. Demographic data of all 50 states and 1 federal 
district over 1978 ± LVFRPSLOHGIURPWKH86&HQVXV%XUHDX¶V6WDWH3URMHFWLRQWDEOHV11. 
Then, regional demographic data is built up by grouping the states for each BEA area. 
4.2.2 Analysis 
We conduct the analysis following JT2015, Equation [2]. Note that the dummyD?  ? has been 
dropped since year 1974 is not covered in the panel. Table 6 reports the panel-regression estimates 
of various model specifications for the U.S. BEA regions12. 
The dependency ratio appears to be positively correlated with inflation (model 1).  From 
model (3), we can see that the young and the old have opposite impacts on inflation: the former 
exert an inflationary pressure while the latter exert a deflationary pressure. The working 
SRSXODWLRQ¶VLPSDFWLVVPDOODQGQRWVLJQLILFDQW 
Using the estimates from model (10), we can visually check the age profile on inflation in 
the US economy. There are two curves in Figure 9. The green curve is from the panel regression 
on U.S. BEA regions during 1978 ± 2010. The dotted blue curve represents the estimates from the 
OECD panel over the same period. The BEA regional panel generates qualitatively similar age 
patterns on inflation as that for the OECD panel over the same period. Quantitatively, the green 
curve seems to be flatter than the dotted blue curve. More important, both curves show that the 
older group is significantly deflationary. Thus, the negative impact of aging on inflation in the 
recent three decades that we observed from the OECD panel also holds for the U.S. regional panel.  
                                                        
8
 For component state list for BEA regions, see http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/regions.cfm. 
9
 In contrast to using CPI based inflation in the study of OECD panels, here we use GRP deflator to measure inflation. 
This is because not all states have CPI based inflation data. For detail, see Bureau of Labor Statistics website: 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiovrvw.htm. 
10
 In macroeconomics, the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to remove the cyclical component of a time series from raw 
data. 
11
 The upper group for the old is 80+ in the OECD panel, but 85+ for the U.S. regional panel. 
12
 Only selected models are reported in this report. Estimates of other models (those with time effects) are available 
upon request. 
   15 
 
4.3 Analysis on the OECD panel with more refined older groups 
From observations of age patterns on inflation obtained, it is quite interesting and reasonable to 
K\SRWKHVL]HWKDWWKH³\RXQJHUROG´PD\EHLQIODWLRQDU\EXWWKH³ROGHUROG´DUHGHIODWLRQDU\6LQFH
WKH81SRSXODWLRQWDEOHGRHVSURYLGHPRUHUHILQHGGHPRJUDSKLFGDWDIRU³ROGHUROG´IURP
i.e. data on 80-84, 85-89, 90-94, 95-99, 100+ age cohorts, we can test the hypothesis using a sub-
period OECD panel over 1990 ± 2010. Figure 10 shows the result. The green curve represents the 
age pattern derived from the new sub-period panel regression with finer demographic data and the 
dark blue dotted line is for the same sub-period panel but with the original age group definition. 
The light blue dotted line is again for the benchmark model with full panel. From the graph, it is 
obvious that our hypothesis is supported. That is, for the old population, the older the age, the more 
deflationary the cohort is. In addition, the working population is (slightly) inflationary for the new 
sub-period panel. 
5 Panel VAR Regression 
The adoption of the reduced-form panel VAR methodology is from a working hypothesis that 
demographic (or age) structure matters for the economy. This assertion is motivated by at least 
two important considerations. First, the life-cycle theory predicts that different age groups have 
different savings behavior. Second, available empirical observations on the age profile of wages 
from labor markets suggest that different age groups appear to have different productivities and to 
work different amounts of hours, with the very young and very old tending to work the least 
number of hours. Both of these factors have implications for labor input. Also different age groups 
appear to generate different types of investment opportunities, as firms target their different 
demands. These adjustments of savings and investment in response to changes in the age structure 
are hypothesized to have an impact on real interest rates, inflation and real output in the economy. 
The approach undertaken in this section has three important characteristics. First, we 
consider one-year periods and adopt a panel time-series approach to estimation of our VAR models. 
Second, we allow for interaction effects among a number of leading macroeconomic variables by 
estimating a VAR model instead of an individual equation. Third, we make no assumptions about 
the underlying economic processes and hence impose a minimal structure on the data. 
The parts of this section are organized as follows. Subsection 5.1 provides the econometric 
framework for the reduced-form panel VAR methodology. Subsection 5.2 reports and discusses 
the reduced-form panel-data VAR estimates, followed by a series of robustness tests. Subsection 
5.3 presents results for selected individual countries. Finally, Subsection 5.4 discusses the out-of-
sample forecasting accuracy of our VAR model with demographic transition changes vis-a-vis a 
VAR model without demographic transition.  
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5.1 Data and econometric model 
The annual dataset covers the period over 1999-2010 covering twenty countries in four continents. 
They comprise: 
x one Asian country13: Japan;  
x two North American countries: United States, Canada; 
x fifteen European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom; and 
x Australia and New Zealand.  
The demographic data was obtained from the United Nations (2012). The annual data on 
savings and investment rates were calculated from Nominal GDP, Investment and Savings series 
obtained from the OECD (2012), which also supplied the data on hours worked. Annual data on 
policy rates and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) were obtained from the IMF (2012). Per-capita 
GDP growth rates were calculated from per-capita real GDP obtained from Penn World Tables.  
We index country by D? where,D? ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ D?, and year by D? where, D? ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ D?. In the 
empirical analysis, we are faced with two challenging problems. First we have at our disposal a 
relatively small number of time-series observations at the annual frequency. Second for each 
country, we also have a large number of macroeconomic control variables which are low frequency 
and, hence, likely to be highly co-linear. Both factors can contribute to low precision of the 
parameter estimates of the panel-data VAR regressions. As a result, we decide on coarser 
demographic proportions by decade. Denote the share of age group D? ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ? (0 -9, 10-19, 20-
29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+) in total population by D?௝௜௧ and suppose the effect on the 
variable of interest, say D?௜௧, takes the form: 
 D?௜௧ ൌ D? ൅ ෍ D?௝ ௝௜௧଻௝ୀ଴ ൅ D?௜௧ Ǥ [5] 
As ?௝ୀ଴଻ D?௝௜௧ ൌ  ?, there is perfect collinearity among the demographic proportions if all the 
demographic shares are included. To deal with this, we restrict the coefficients to sum to 0, use D?௝௜௧ െ D?଻௜௧ as explanatory variables and recover the coefficient of the oldest age group fromD?଻ ൌെ ?௝ୀ଴଺ D?௝.  We denote the 7 elements vector of D?௝௜௧ െ D?଻௜௧ asD?௜௧. 
The six endogenous variables of the system are: 
1. the growth rate of the real GDP, D?௜௧;  
2. the share of investment in GDP, D?௜௧;  
3. the share of personal savings in GDP, D?௜௧;  
                                                        
13
 In this short panel, Korea is excluded as an outlier. 
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4. the logarithm of hours worked14, D?௜௧;  
5. the nominal short interest rate, D?௜௧; and  
6. the rate of inflation, D?௜௧.  
We denote the vector of these six variables asD?௜௧ ൌ ൫D?D?D?ǡ D?D?D?ǡ D?D?D?ǡ D?D?D?ǡ D?D?D?ǡ D?D?D?൯. The exogenous 
variables are: D?௜௧ and two lags of the logarithm of the real oil price15.  
There are likely to be complicated dynamic interactions among the six economic variables, 
but there is relatively little research aimed at suggesting an appropriate model for panel data.  Bond 
et al. (2010) consider a relationship between D?௜௧  and D?௜௧  in detail. However we also expect 
interaction with the other variables because of the other theoretical linkages mentioned earlier.  
Ideally we would like to estimate an identified structural system between these six variables 
allowing for expectations. Suppose, ignoring oil prices, that such a structural system would be 
given by: 
 Ȱ଴D?௧ ൌ ȰଵሾD?௧ାଵሿ ൅ ȰଶD?௧ାଶ ൅ D?௧ ൅ D?௧ Ǥ [6] 
Then there is a unique and stationary solution if all the eigenvalues of D? and ሺD? െ ȰଵD?ሻିଵȰଵ lie strictly inside the unit circle, where D? solves the quadratic matrix equation: 
 ȰଵD?ଶ െ Ȱ଴D? ൅ Ȱଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ [7] 
In that case the solution is: 
 D?௧ ൌ D?D?௧ିଵ ൅ Ȱ଴ି ଵD?௧ ൅ Ȱ଴ି ଵD?௧Ǥ [8] 
It is difficult to identify the structural system such as Equation [6]. If there are D? 
endogenous variables, to identify Equation [6] we need to impose  ?D?ଶ identifying restrictions (see 
the discussion in Koop et al., 2011; Komunjer and Ng, 2011). For this reason, in this project, we 
opt for estimating the solution or reduced form of such a structural system and assume that 
conditional on the exogenous variables it can be written as a VAR, such as Equation [9] below. 
Notice that since D? will be a complicated function of all the structural parameters, as the Equation 
in [7] shows, it would be difficult to interpret the coefficients of the equation. 
The objective of this analysis is primarily to provide predictions of the long-run effect of 
the demographic variables. These predictions could be obtained from a structural model as in 
Equation [9]. Over-identifying restrictions, if they are available and binding, would increase the 
efficiency of the estimation, but given that we have a relatively large panel, the efficiency issue 
would not be a paramount issue here. 
                                                        
14
 It is customary in empirical studies to take the logarithm of continuous variables in order to (i) stabilize the variance 
of the variables a bit, to capture potential nonlinearities in the variable; (ii) to render residuals more symmetrically 
distributed; and (iii) to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient estimates of parameters as elasticities. 
15
 The reason we use two lags on the oil price, rather than one, is because the second lag is statistically significantly 
different from 0. 
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We allow for intercept heterogeneity through D?௜  but assume slope homogeneity and 
estimate a one-way fixed-effect augmented-panel VAR (2) of the form: 
 D?௜௧ ൌ D?௜ ൅ D?ଵD?௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ D?ଶD?௜ǡ௧ିଶ ൅ D?௜௧ ൅ D?௜௧ Ǥ [9] 
plus two lags of the oil price. D? is the matrix of coefficients of the demographic variables.  
Our estimate of the effect of the demographic variables captures the marginal effect after 
having controlled for lagged D?௜௧ and the oil price. Implicitly we assume either that all the variables 
are weakly stationary or that an unrestricted VAR will capture stationary combinations by either 
differencing or co-integrating linear combinations. Even these variables may be non-stationary. 
We do not exploit efficiency that comes from looking at long-run regressions such as co-
integrating regressions. We are more concerned with policy effects and hence emphasize the 
endogeneity and short-term nature of the relationships. Bond et al. (2010) discuss this issue with 
respect to the investment share and Phillips and Moon (1999) and Coakley et al. (2006) suggest 
that spurious regression may be less of a problem in panel data with a dominating cross-sectional 
dimension. 
Slope heterogeneity, if it is ignored, could have an adverse effect on dynamic panel data. 
In particular, Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that it can produce bias in the coefficient estimates 
of the lagged dependent variable towards one and the coefficient of the exogenous variable towards 
zero. However these two biases may offset each other in the calculation of the long-run effects, 
which is the focus of our interest. We adopt a fixed effect estimator which imposes slope 
homogeneity across countries, partly because we are estimating a great number of slope parameters 
and partly because the demographic variables show very low frequency variation relative to annual 
time-series and the elements are highly correlated. Thus heterogeneous estimates based on 
relatively few degrees of freedom may be poorly determined and likely to produce outliers. We 
found this to be the case when we experimented with VARs for each country. In addition, Baltagi 
and Griffin (1997) and Baltagi et al. (2000) show that the homogeneous estimators tend to have 
better forecasting properties. Therefore, since our main aim in this analysis is to predict the 
variables conditional on demographics, the homogeneous estimators may provide better predictors 
of this demographic contribution. 
The long-run moving equilibrium for system is then given by: 
 D?௜௧כ ൌ ሺD? െ D?ଵ െ D?ଶሻିଵD?௜ ൅ ሺD? െ D?ଵ െ D?ଶሻିଵD?D?௜௧ Ǥ [10] 
where ሺD? െ D?ଵ െ D?ଶሻିଵD? captures the effect of the demographic variables. This reflects both the 
direct effect of demographics on each variable and the feedback between the endogenous variables. 
This allows, for instance, the effects of demography on savings to influence growth through the 
effect of savings on growth.  
We can isolate the long-run contribution of demography to each variable in each country 
by: 
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 D?௜௧஽ ൌ ሺD? െ D?ଵ െ D?ଶሻିଵD?D?௜௧ Ǥ [11] 
This is the demographic attractor for the economic variables at any given time. This is a 
long-run estimate in a specific sense of being the long run forecast for the economic variables 
conditional on a particular vector of demographic shares after the completion of the endogenous 
adjustment of the economic variables. But over time the shares would also change as people grow 
older, so this is not a long-run steady state which would also allow for the extra adjustment of the 
demographic shares to their equilibrium, which we do not model here. In this analysis, we will 
examine the movements of elements of this vector,D?௜௧஽, over time, to indicate the low frequency 
contribution of demographics to the evolution of a particular variable in a particular country. 
5.2 Results of Panel-data VAR regressions 
We choose between the panel-data VAR (1) and panel-data VAR (2) specification on the basis of 
the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). On that basis, we find that a one-way fixed-
effect model with country intercepts was preferred for every equation to a two-way fixed-effect 
model with country and year intercepts, but without the oil price. This suggests that cross-section 
dependence or common trends is not a major problem with the VAR specification, but we 
investigate the robustness of our results to this below. A panel-data VAR (1) specification and a 
panel-data VAR (2) specification had almost identical BICs, although the VAR (2) specification 
has slightly smaller BIC values, indicating that it fits the data slightly better. As a result, we decided 
to use a VAR (2) specification primarily to allow for more flexible dynamics and to deal with 
potential non-stationarity. 
Allowing for more flexible dynamics in the VAR specification is critical for our setting 
since there are complicated dynamic interactions between the six economic variables and there is 
relatively little known results in the literature suggesting an appropriate model for panel data. For 
instance, even if we focus on the relationship between output and investment, we would still need 
to take into account interaction with the other variables because of the other theoretical linkages 
that exist in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting. General equilibrium effects are 
critically relevant in a study of this sort, as other variables adjust. In particular, crucial intervening 
variables in the transmission of demographic structure to growth and savings are years in 
education; the age, sex and skill specific labour force participation rates and pension wealth. 
Although there are difficult measurement issues associated with each of these factors, all seem to 
have shown large variations over our sample. In addition in an explicitly dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium framework, savings (hence consumption) is subject to both substitution and 
wealth (income) effects. In our savings analysis, we have included nominal short term policy rates 
and inflation in order to capture inter-temporal consumption preferences. Moreover, working with 
a VAR (2) specification (instead of VAR(1) specification) reduces the potential of spurious 
regression although we believe that spurious regression is less of a problem in the panel data setting, 
in particular when the cross-section dimension is large relatively to the dimension of time series. 
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Table 7 reports the D?ଵ ൅ D?ଶ matrix. In this table, each row represents an equation in the 
panel-data VAR representation. We observe that hours are highly persistent and investment, 
savings, nominal interest rates and inflation rate are equally so. We also note that there is evidence 
that all of the endogenous variables Granger cause16 some other variables in the system, perhaps 
with the exception of savings which is found not to be a significant influence on any other variable. 
Lagged growth is shown to significantly affect all the variables including savings and interest rates. 
Investment is found to significantly influence growth, inflation and savings. Hours also 
significantly impact interest rates and inflation. Interest rates significantly influence growth, 
investment and hours. Inflation significantly affects interest rates. Lastly oil prices are shown to 
significantly influence all of the six variables with the exception of investment.  We are surprised 
to find that lagged investment has a negative effect on growth, despite the fact, as noted below, 
that there is a strong positive contemporaneous correlation between the growth and investment 
residuals. For OECD countries Bond et al. (2010) found a small positive effect in the bivariate 
relationship. The nominal interest rate has a negative effect on all the other variables, and although 
inflation has a positive effect, the coefficients are quantitatively small, indicating that this is not 
picking up a real interest rate effect. 
Table 8 reports the D matrix of short term demographic impacts on the six endogenous 
variables. We find that the individual coefficients are not very well determined due to high 
collinearity among the variables in the VAR specification, but the hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the demographic variables are jointly not significantly different from zero is strongly rejected 
for all equations except hours worked (see Table 16 and Table 17). In theory, we would expect 
that the demographic structure has significant impacts on hours worked. That it does not in our 
empirical results may indicate that there are likely to be offsetting adjustments in the labor force 
participation rates. Generally the results are plausible, although there are some unexpected results. 
For instance there is a negative effect of the 30-39 age group on growth and a positive effect of 
teenagers on savings and of the 60-69 years cohort on investment. 
Table 9 gives the ሺD? െ D?ଵ െ D?ଶሻିଵD? matrix. We note that by allowing for rich dynamics 
and interactions among the macroeconomic variables, the long-run effects are found to be much 
larger. In particular, we notice that the effect on hours is markedly more pronounced in our 
empirical results, perhaps due to this variable being highly persistent over time. 
Table 10 reports the matrix of correlations between the residuals of each equation of the 
panel-data VAR regression. We see evidence of strong contemporaneous correlations between the 
residuals of some of the equations, potentially capturing business cycle effects. The correlation 
coefficient between the residuals from the growth equation and the residuals from the investment 
equation is recorded at 0.432, the savings equation 0.486 and the hours equation 0.410 respectively. 
                                                        
16
 ³*UDQJHUFDXVH´LVDWHUPIRUDVSHFLILFQRWLRQRIFDXVDOLW\LQWLPH-series analysis, first proposed in Granger (1969). 
The idea is: A variable X Granger-causes Y if Y can be better predicted using the histories of both X and Y than it 
can using the history of Y alone. 
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These are the largest recorded sample correlation coefficients in our analysis. All of the sample 
correlations are expected to be positive, except, for a very small negative correlation between 
savings and interest rates. 
5.2.1 Robustness to the presence of time effects 
As mentioned earlier, the model chosen according to BIC assumes one-way fixed-effects and 
includes oil prices as a measure of technology shocks across countries. One potential drawback of 
this approach concerns the presence of marked trends in our data. If there are shared, cross-country, 
factors driving the trend in the dependent variable as well as the demographic variables, this trend 
may be wrongly attributed to the demographic variables in the one-way, country, fixed-effect 
model. A two-way effects model avoids this issue by removing any common cross-country factors 
from all variables prior to estimation. 
Table 11 shows the long-term impact of demographic variables under a two-way fixed-
effects VAR model. When comparing the results in this table with those reported in Table 9, we 
observe that although the impact does change significantly for inflation, hours and savings, the 
impact on GDP growth is remarkably robust to the chosen effect. This result leads us to conclude 
that the impact of demographic variables on growth and investment identified by the panel-data 
VAR (2) specification is not a statistical artifact of a spurious correlation. 
5.2.2 Robustness to exclusion of individual countries 
In this subsection, we test the robustness of our results with respect to the selected countries by re-
estimating the specification in the panel-data VAR (2) regression on a dataset with each country 
excluded in turn.  
The results are not presented in this report for brevity. Briefly we obtain results that are 
relatively stable with respect to these exclusions, as are the tests as to whether the demographic 
variables are significant in each equation. 
5.2.3 Structural Change 
We also test for potential structural change by estimating the panel-data VAR regression 
on various sub-periods of the entire dataset, and then selecting the preferred panel-data VAR 
specification using the BIC. 
Again, for brevity, we do not include the results of this specification in this report. Briefly 
we find that for the first four equations in the VAR models, namely, growth, investment, savings 
and hours worked, a country-by-country VAR specification over the full sample period is preferred 
over the VAR specifications with structural breaks in any given year. For the last two equations, 
interest rates and inflation, we find that the VAR models with 2008 and 2004 as the break points 
tend to be preferred based on the BIC. 
Estimating the panel-data VAR regression over two subsamples spanning 1999-2005 and 
2006-2010 respectively yields results that differ from the full sample estimation as well as each 
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other, indicating the possible presence of structural instability. For brevity, the results are not 
reported here. Briefly the ranges of the demographic variables for the two sub-periods are also 
found to be somewhat different, however, and the second period has a vastly reduced variation in 
interest rates since the Euro member countries in our sample shared a common rate for much of 
the period. 
5.3 Country-specific study  
In this section, we consider how the results obtained in our study may shed some light on the 
question of whether the baby boomers squandered the demographic dividend. For this purpose, we 
conduct a counterfactual analysis. Table 12 shows, for the countries with available data, the impact 
on the six variables of the change in demographic structure between 1970 when the baby boomers 
were participating in the labor market, and 2010, when they were approaching retirement. This is 
calculated using Equation [10] and the long-run estimates from the one way fixed effect model.17 
Note that only for the purpose of conducting a counterfactual exercise do we include observations 
starting from 1970 in our empirical analysis. In all other analysis, the estimation starts from 1999. 
This is because our experiment suggests that the panel-data VAR regressions exhibit major 
structural instabilities when the earlier samples from 1970 to 1998 are included in the estimation, 
producing highly biased estimates of the parameters. 
The estimated impact of demographic changes on GDP is expected to vary across countries, 
but given our VAR model, 2010 real GDP growth would have been 2.88% less for Japan as 
compared to 1970 and 0.69% less for the U.S. In general, given our estimated panel-data VAR 
regression, Japan in 2010, as compared to 1970, has been mostly affected by the changes in the 
age profile, as all variables would have been substantively depressed including the hours worked. 
It appears, that given our panel-data VAR specification, while in various countries there would 
have been some form of contrarian adjustment in the hours worked as a response to demographic 
pressures, Japanese and, to a limited extent, we expect that Finnish and Swedish labor markets 
would not have followed such a pattern. 
We also find that the estimated impact of demographic changes on both the interest rate 
and inflation is strongly negative and of quite similar orders of magnitude, consistent with real 
interest rate effects. Since the 1970s were the decade when the baby boomers entered the labor 
force strongly, we might have expected the supply-side effect to be deflationary, the arrival of such 
a large cohort depressing wages, but the demand-side effects might have been inflationary. 
Although both interest rates and inflation are expected to be higher around 1970 than in 2010, the 
change over the period is not expected to be as large as predicted by demographic factors. However, 
                                                        
17
 The nature of low frequency variables increases the likelihood of high collinearity among these variables in 
individual country regressions. Pooling variables across countries may mitigate the dominance of those variables and 
HQKDQFHHIILFLHQF\E\KDYLQJPRUHREVHUYDWLRQVDQGWDNLQJDGYDQWDJHVRI³FRPPRQ´VKRFNVIDFHGE\WKHFountries. 
But at the same time, it might mask some of the idiosyncratic shocks associated with each country.  
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the two-way fixed-effects estimates above suggest that the demographic effects on these two 
variables might be overstated. 
The estimated panel-data VAR regression can also be applied to the predicted future 
demographic structure. Using both historic data and forecasts for the demographic structure, Table 
13 provides forecasts of the average impact of demographic structure on average annual per-capita 
GDP growth over the decade 2010 - 2019, and compares it to that over 2000-2009. It suggests that 
in all countries in our sample the impact of demographic factors over this decade will put 
downward pressure on GDP growth. The magnitude of this pressure is likely to be economically 
highly significant: for the U.S., for example, it is -1.35%. 
5.4 Forecast Performance 
An important measure of the usefulness of any econometric model is the extent to which it is 
capable of forecasting future events out of samples. With this in mind we carry out an ex-post 
forecasting exercise of our panel-data VAR model; that is, we estimate the model using the data 
available up to 2005 and use that model to forecast the path of the economy over the following 
five years, 2005-2010.  
Table 14 presents the results from a series of one-year-ahead forecasts, where period D? 
realized values are used to forecast period D? ൅  ? outcomes. We find that adding demographic 
variables to the panel-data VAR specification improves the accuracy in this sample for all variables 
other than savings and hours worked. 
Table 15 reports results from five-year-rolling forecasts. Here, the forecasts for the current 
year are used as inputs to forecast the next year, consistent with a long-range forecast. Again the 
demographic variables are shown to improve the forecasts of inflation and interest rates over the 
VAR model without demographics. 
6 Conclusion and Future Research 
Two types of analyses have been conducted. Here we summarize the key features of what we 
learned from each of the exercises, and also the weaknesses. 
The first piece of analysis involved the use of cross-country panel data regressions, 
subsequently applied to regions in the United States. We identified two recent working papers that 
purportedly find opposite effects despite using data for a similar group of countries from a similar 
period. We replicated the benchmark results of the two studies to determine if there were any 
technical features that were leading to the apparent disagreement. On careful comparison, we 
found that the difference in results does not appear to be simply a feature of the data, as a 
comparable specification has the same results. Thus, we looked at the key differences in their 
methodologies and their interpretation of their results. 
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In terms of interpretation, when YKL2014 find negative coefficients for elderly age groups 
when they regress inflation on a set of variables, they should only be able to conclude that aging 
is disinflationary, not deflationary (as the coefficients are relative rather than absolute). Thus, their 
findings are not as different as they seem to those of JT2015. The latter authors also find that a 
polynomial function reflecting the effect of various age groups on inflation turns downwards at 
the higher ages, but they discount this finding. 
The model specification of YKL2014 incorporates the effect of population growth, an 
important consideration that is not covered in all the other analyses discussed here. However, their 
methodology makes the odd choice of running a regression (on annual frequency) of detrended 
inflation on detrended demographic variables. This is unfortunate, as our interest is in discovering 
the relationship between the trends rather than the annual deviations from trend in these variables. 
The annual frequency remains a limitation of all the papers discussed. 
The replication analysis suggests that the different choice of specification and methodology 
results in different findings between the two studies. Besides, there is only weak support for the 
points where there is any contention between the two studies. 
Our analyses on the OECD panel over different sub-periods and on the U.S. regional panel 
suggest that it is the sub-period, rather than the panel sample, that determines the pattern of the 
impact of aging on inflation. In addition, we believe that, as supported by the study on OECD data 
after 1990, a finer adjustment to age categories is needed to capture the potentially different effects 
of the older and younger of the 65+ age group. That is, for the old population, the older the age, 
the more deflationary the cohort is. This finding suggests that studies on the old should use a 
greater number of age groups. This is particularly important because the size and the length of this 
age group is increasing due to increasing longevity. 
The challenge of determining the link between aging and inflation is that demographic 
changes exert (according to theory) opposing forces on price levels. Keeping population size 
constant, aging causes reduced expectations of growth and consumption (deflationary), while also 
reducing the resources available for production. This latter effect can take place directly or through 
structural transformation, which are both inflationary. An empirical examination of the 
relationship suffers from the danger of failing to control for other more salient factors that affect 
inflation. Moreover, the data appears to be a source of another problem ± there is very little 
evidence of deflationary episodes in our sample period, making it difficult to analyse the prospects 
for deflation as opposed to disinflation, or inflation falling to low levels. 
The second piece of analysis attempts to address this problem through a cross-country 
panel vector auto regression (VAR) model, whereby several key variables were modelled jointly 
to be able to identify the effect of the age distribution on inflation. Our results indicate that the age 
profile of the population can have both an economically and a statistically significant impact on 
output growth, investment, savings, hours worked, interest rates and inflation. However, the panel 
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VAR analysis suggests that the older age group is slightly inflationary. This result may be caused 
by coarse demographic groups and the short period studied. We report that our model is robust to 
the presence of time effects and exclusion of individual countries. We also find that our model 
with demographic structure improves the panel-data VAR specification that excludes demographic 
variables. This leads us to conclude that using such a model should provide more accurate 
predictions for growth over the long term horizon. 
The panel VAR analysis had several limitations. Firstly, to better identify demographic 
shocks, it would be desirable to use a longer period of data. The short period of data also 
necessitated analysis at the annual frequency, though it would be reasonable to assume that 
demography affects the economy in more subtle ways over longer periods of time. However, to 
understand relationships such as that between aging and inflation, the VAR could prove to be a 
useful methodology. Both age structure and inflation demonstrate long memory and there is a risk 
of detecting spurious relationships if the possibility of co-integration is not properly tested. 
Secondly, estimation of the coefficients of low frequency and highly collinear determinants 
is highly sensitive to the specification of the model and the estimation method used. Endogeneity 
is also another serious problem in this type of study. Although the proportions in each age group 
are plausibly exogenous, the other leading macroeconomic variables in the system are likely to be 
responding to the low frequency demographic impacts. For example, the high birth rate that 
produced the baby boomers after the Second World War is unlikely to be influenced by growth 
rates in the 1990s, but these growth rates may be driven, at least in part, by this baby boom. This 
has the effect of reducing the marginal contribution of the demographic variables to the overall 
performance of the economy.  
Lastly, there are likely to be nontrivial second-round general equilibrium effects, as other 
variables adjust in the system in response to shocks impinging on the economy. This is particularly 
the case with key intermediate variables engaged in the transmission of demographic structure to 
growth and savings, such as years in education; the age, sex and skill-specific labor force 
participation rates and pension wealth. In various studies, all of these variables have been shown 
to have large variations over time and across countries. 
By taking into account the advantages of each of the approaches, we could improve the 
empirical analysis by including the appropriate variables over a longer horizon and adopting 
methodologies that take into account the smoother long-term variation in age structure. Such a 
methodology would involve either trend comparisons by sampling data over lower frequencies or 
conducting a co-integration analysis. Further exploration of the frequency domain of the 
underlying variables would also be useful. But such analysis is beyond the scope of this project.  
In conclusion, the research demonstrates that demographic structure does affect economic 
factors such as growth and inflation. However, the measurement and quantification of this impact 
remain challenging problems worthy of further research. This effect has significant implications 
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for actuaries who make and rely on projections of demographic and economic effects in their work. 
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Table 1: Comparison with YKL2014 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
 YKL2014 Our Est. No Detrend YKL2014 Our Est. No Detrend YKL2014 Our Est. No Detrend 
Pop. Growth_de 0.339 2.593**  0.524 2.694**     
Pop. Growth   0.906   0.454    
Share_old    -0.176*** -0.121 -1.484*** -0.125** -0.0837 -1.331*** 
Share_work       -0.101 0.135 -1.718*** 
GDP growth -0.145*** -4.774 -11.02 -0.144*** -5.210 -16.12 -0.145*** -5.717 -5.832 
Life Exp. -0.750*** -0.336** -0.162 -0.795*** -0.345** -0.271 -0.799*** -0.348** -0.141 
M2 growth 0.192*** 0.0202 0.0963** 0.183*** 0.0180 0.0676* 0.180*** 0.0187 0.0305 
Budget chg. 0.129* -0.0934 0.0619 0.153** -0.0922 0.0644 0.153** -0.0945 -0.0611 
Constant -0.053 1.229 3.955*** 2.418* 2.637 21.84*** 8.443 -6.857 134.5*** 
 
         
Observations 1167 650 650 1167 650 650 1167 650 650 
Num. country 30 27 27 30 27 27 30 27 27 
R-squared 0.212 0.311 0.310 0.216 0.316 0.405 0.217 0.309 0.500 
RMSE 5.235 5.907 5.875 5.227 5.909 5.451 5.223 5.936 5.000 
1. Models correspond to those in the left part of Table 4 in YKL2014. 
2. Fixed-effect estimation for OECD regression using annual data.  
3. The estimates of fixed effects are omitted. 
4. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Comparison with YKL2014 (Cont.) 
Model (4) (5)  
 YKL2014 Our Est. No Detrend YKL2014 Our Est. No Detrend    
Pop. Growth_de 0.549 2.674**  0.317 2.963**     
Pop. Growth   3.533***   4.245***    
Share_old -0.137*** -0.121 -1.273*** -0.416*** -0.485*** -0.476**    
Share_work -0.103 0.0132 -1.970*** -0.330** -0.225 -1.530***    
Life Exp.    0.304** 0.418** -0.913***    
TOT chg -0.144*** -5.286 -5.945 -0.143*** -7.587 -0.838    
GDP growth -0.802*** -0.346** -0.137 -0.784*** -0.345** -0.138    
M2 growth 0.180*** 0.0183 0.0272 0.176*** 0.0195 0.0238    
Budget chg. 0.158** -0.0913 -0.0243 0.150** -0.0722 -0.0579    
Constant 8.739 1.770 145.8*** 4.132 -10.66 177.2***    
 
      
   
Observations 1167 650 650 1167 650 650    
Num. country 30 27 27 30 27 27    
R-squared 0.217 0.314 0.515 0.222 0.317 0.531    
RMSE 5.223 5.914 4.923 5.209 5.904 4.840    
1. Models correspond to those in the left part of Table 4 in YKL2014. 
2. Fixed-effect estimation for OECD regression using annual data.  
3. The estimates of fixed effects are omitted. 
4. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Comparison with JT2015 
Model (1) (3) (5) 
 JT2015 Our Est. 30 countries JT2015 Our Est. 30 countries JT2015 Our Est. 30 countries 
Dep. rate 0.17 0.18 0.13       
 
(11.16) (14.05) (4.62) 
      
Share_young    0.31 0.40 0.31    
 
   
(10.61) (14.55) (6.62) 
   
Share_work    -0.23 -0.22 -0.00    
 
   
(-7.67) (-7.86) (-3.63) 
   
Share_old    0.31 0.44 0.00    
 
   
(4.25) (5.45) (2.65) 
   
Poly n1       1.95 1.99 3.02 
 
      
(14.15) (14.22) (5.81) 
Poly n2       -4.62 -4.86 -6.77 
(×10)       (-14.97) (-14.91) (-5.77) 
Poly n3       3.90 4.18 5.42 
(×102)       (14.62) (14.60) (5.39) 
Poly n4       -1.07 -1.16 -1.41 
(×103)       (-13.92) (-14.04) (-4.93) 
 
         
R-squared 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.16 0.65 0.28 0.30 0.38 0.18 
Observations 1276 1232 1568 1276 1232 1568 1276 1232 1568 
1. Models correspond to those in Table 1 of JT2015. 
2. Fixed-effect estimation for OECD regression using annual data.  
3. The estimates of constant and fixed effects are omitted.  
4. Robust t statistics in brackets. 
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Table 4: Comparison with JT2015 (Cont.) 
Model (7) (8) (10) Bench Mark Model 
 JT2015 Our Est. 30 countries JT2015 Our Est. 30 countries JT2015 Our Est. 30 countries 
Poly n1 1.72 1.76 2.85    1.91 1.34 2.88 
 
(12.68) (12.75) (5.45)    (18.43) (12.32) (11.32) 
Poly n2 -4.10 -4.32 -6.37    -4.16 -3.00 -5.91 
(×10) (-13.49) (-13.51) (-5.42)    (-17.66) (-12.80) (-11.05) 
Poly n3 3.46 3.72 5.09    3.26 2.35 4.39 
(×102) (13.21) (13.31) (5.06)    (16.01) (11.93) (10.02) 
Poly n4 -0.95 -1.04 -1.32    -0.84 -0.60 -1.07 
(×103) (-12.59) (-12.85) (-4.63)    (-18.13) (-10.70) (-8.80) 
Real int.    -0.56 -0.58 -0.99 -0.59 -0.59 -1.00 
 
   (-14.46) (-12.65) (-13.22) (-18.13) (-15.42) (-14.06) 
Out. gap    0.08 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.02 
 
   (1.78) (3.21) (0.29) (3.94) (4.90) (0.74) 
D74 6.95 6.37 3.16 4.79 5.22 1.20 2.37 2.89 -1.21 
 
(6.45) (6.82) (1.56) (8.89) (10.09) (0.92) (3.49) (5.50) (-0.96) 
D80 5.36 5.48 6.12 6.67 5.90 5.05 3.87 3.56 1.35 
 
(6.07) (6.61) (1.90) (11.20) (9.34) (5.24) (5.56) (6.18) (1.47) 
 
      
   
R-squared 0.36 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.47 0.65 0.62 0.70 0.72 
Observations 1276 1232 1568 1232 1023 1280 1232 1023 1280 
1. Models correspond to those in Table 2 of JT2015. 
2. Fixed-effect estimation for OECD regression using annual data.  
3. The estimates of constant and fixed effects are omitted.  
4. Robust t statistics in brackets. 
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Table 5: Combined datasets, no control variables 
 22 OECD Countries, 1960-2010 30 OECD countries, 1960-2010 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of young, 0-14  0.43***    0.37***   
Share of work, 15-64 -0.52*** -0.08***   -0.39* -0.02   
Share of young, 0-19    0.42***    0.40*** 
Share of work, 20-64   -0.61*** -0.19***   -0.55*** -0.15** 
Share of old, 65+ -0.43*** -0.00 -0.18** 0.24** -0.62*** -0.25 -0.33** 0.07 




    
R-squared 0.30 0.68 0.34 0.69 0.16 0.29 0.16 0.29 
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122 1438 1438 1438 1438 
1 Models (1) and (3) correspond to Equation [3], and model (2) and (4) correspond to Equation [4]. 
2 Fixed-effect estimation for OECD regression using annual data. 
3 The estimates of fixed effects are omitted. 
4. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Panel Analysis on the U.S. economic regions 
Model (1) (3) (5) (7) (8) (10) 
Dep. rate 0.28***      
Share_young  0.39***     
Share_work  -0.01     
Share_old  -0.71*     
Poly n1   1.11** 0.96**  0.80** 
Poly n2 (×10)   -2.36*** -2.13***  -1.97*** 
Poly n3 (×102)   1.83*** 1.68***  1.64*** 
Poly n4 (×103)   -0.48*** -0.43***  -0.44*** 
Real int.     0.19** 0.11 
Out. gap     0.09 0.07 
D80    4.77*** 5.84*** 4.86*** 
 
  
   
 
R-squared 0.13 0.74 0.35 0.46 0.23 0.48 
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 
1. Models correspond to those in Table 1 and Table 2 of JT2015. 
2. Model (10) is the benchmark specification. 
3. Fixed-effect estimation for US economic regions using annual data. 
4. The estimates of constant and fixed effects are omitted. 
5. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 





y 0.278*** -0.396*** 0.014*** 0.0156* -0.272*** -0.083*** 
I 0.132*** 0.698*** 0.017*** 0.043 -0.145*** 0.010*** 
S -0.149*** -0.141*** 0.810*** -0.005 -0.184*** 0.026** 
H 0.244*** -0.075*** -0.000*** 0.049 0. 141*** 0.025*** 
R 0.335*** 0.019*** -0.045*** 0.047*** 0.774*** 0.049*** D? 0.424*** 0.245*** 0.238*** -0.023*** -0.182*** 0.723*** 









(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 




(inflation) D?଴ -0.002 0.063* -0.066** -0.010 0.018 0.492 D?ଵ 0. 21 -0. 040 0.053 -0.070 0.037 0.100 D?ଶ 0.232 0.097 0.025 0.059* -0.05 -0.131 D?ଷ -0.004 -0.069* 0.116** 0.106 -0.174 -0. 43 D?ସ 0.045 0.017 0.137 0.013** -0. 09 -0. 218 D?ହ 0.042 0.055 0.215* 0.14 0.074 -0.041 D?଺ -0.000 0.258 0.048 0.100 0.091 -0.041 D?଻ -0.415 -0.312 -0.580 -0.320 -0. 191 0. 163 
1. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
2. D?௜ are coefficients of age cohorts. 
3. D?଻ is derived from restrictions as described in Section 5.1 
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(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 




(inflation) D?଴ -0. 267 -0.190 -0.185 -0.109 0. 575 0.975 D?ଵ 0.268 -0.170 0. 591 -0. 420 0.281 0.518 D?ଶ 0.088 0.432 -0. 246 0. 535 0. 432 -0.213 D?ଷ 0.112 0.231* 0.361 1.864 -0. 540 -1.002 D?ସ 0.082 0.049 0.411 0.610 -0. 553 -0. 584 D?ହ -0.037 0.139 0.802 0.822 0.261 -0.1341 D?଺ -0.314 0.310 -0.141 -1.015 0.470 0. 172 D?଻ 0.0611 -1.021 -1. 538 -1. 433 -0.755 0.043 
1. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
2. D?௜ are coefficients of age cohorts. 
 





(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 





Y 1.000 0.432 0.486 0.410 0.391 0.278 
I 0.432 1.000 0.027 0.262 0.148 0.235 
S 0.486 0.027 1.000 -0.279 -0.037 0.061 
H 0.410 0.262 -0.279 1.000 0.195 0.182 
R 0.391 0.148 -0.037 0.195 1.000 0.295 D? 0.278 0.235 0.061 0.182 0.295 1.000 
 





(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 




(inflation) D?଴ -0. 239 -0.310 -0.084 -1.523 0. 371 0.386 D?ଵ 0.251 -0.262 0.948 -0.070 0.157 0.325 D?ଶ 0.716 0.375 -0.012 0. 512 -0.105 -0. 411 D?ଷ 0.108 0. 195 0.370 2.022 -0.723 -0.648 D?ସ 0.106 0. 561 0. 214 0.958 0.031 -0.013 D?ହ -0.040 0.060 0.231 0.461 0.392 -0. 073 D?଺ -0.030 0.546 0.041 -0.701 0.176 -0. 178 D?଻ 0.032 -1.14 -1.760 -1.716 -0.430 0.536 
   37 
 
 
Table 12: Difference in Predicted Impact of Demographic Factors between 1970 and 2010 (in 





(share of invest) 
S 
(share of saving) 
H 





Australia -0.357 -0.174 -4.336 7.829 -7.911 -11. 816 
Austria 1.448 -0. 555 -0.879 11.041 -9.522 -11. 895 
Belgium 0.183 -2.579 -4.962 4.187 -7.059 -7.250 
Canada -1.251 -0.655 -3.922 11.694 -9.639 -15.141 
Denmark -0.496 -1.781 -1.833 1.758 -5.675 -6.256 
Finland -1.750 -4.393 -9.207 -3.667 -7.590 -7.433 
France -0.261 -2.498 -4.292 3.896 -6.580 -7.627 
Germany 1.404 -7.101 -10.007 -8.796 -12.773 -9.584 
Greece 0.215 -3.587 -9.478 5.017 -11.058 -11.411 
Iceland -0.18340 2.065 -0.752 16.220 -8.736 -14. 764 
Ireland 0.830 5.093 0.934 22.338 -9.908 -17.299 
Italy 0.105 -5.575 -11.659 1.1865 -11.069 -11.576 
Japan -2.884 -10.418 -17.562 -16.961 -9.913 -7.166 
Netherlands -0.751 -0.852 -2.051 5.855 -7.690 -10.916 
New Zealand 0.018 0.883 -3.149 13.266 -9. 063 -13. 647 
Norway 0.455 0.095 -0.817 9.392 -6.475 -9.083 
Sweden -0.052 -3.631 -4.885 -1.390 -5.488 -4.262 
Switzerland 0.240 -2.626 -3.188 3. 862 -8.473 -9.169 
United Kingdom 0.985 -1.32 -4.075 5.238 -8.327 -8.425 
United States -0.686 0.822 -2.501 9. 120 -6.426 -10.331 
1. This was calculated by applying the estimated long-run demographic coefficients to the demographic structure in each country 
as it was in 1970 and in 2010, and subtracting the result of the former from the latter. Updated April 20, 2015 to include Germany 
based on same parameter estimates as used for other countries. 
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Table 13: Average Predicted Impact on GDP Growth by Country, in percentage points 
 2000-2009 2010-2019 Change 
Australia 1.914 0.898 -1.016 
Austria 1.628 0.938 -0.69 
Belgium 1.397 0.353 -1.044 
Canada 2.134 0.469 -1.665 
Denmark 0.753 0.296 -0.457 
Finland 0.985 -0.037 -1.022 
France 1.538 0.693 -0.845 
Germany 0.952 0.614 -0.338 
Greece 1.479 0.692 -0.787 
Iceland 2.220 1.013 -1.207 
Ireland 2.118 0.970 -1.148 
Italy 1.047 0.489 -0.558 
Japan 0.341 -0.104 -0.445 
Netherlands 1.337 0.277 -1.06 
New Zealand 1.970 0.771 -1.199 
Norway 1.548 0.565 -0.983 
Sweden 1.137 0.187 -0.95 
Switzerland 1.568 0.700 -0.868 
United Kingdom 1.461 0.647 -0.814 
United States 1.969 0.622 -1.347 
1. These results are calculated by applying estimated long-run demographic impacts on growth to the demographic structure of the 
population each year, and averaging the results over each period. The latter period is based on demographic forecasts from United 
Nations (2012). We use the long-run impact to allow for interaction effects. Updated April 20, 2015 to include Germany based on 
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Table 14: 1-Year-Ahead VAR Forecast, 2005-2010 
 Without Demographics With Demographics 
 RMSE Bias cum.Corr RMSE Bias cum.Corr 
Y 
(GDP growth) 0.027 0.115 0.208 0.025 -0.000 0.422 
I 
(share of invest) 0.014 0.004 0.888 0.016 -0.001 0.945 
S 
(share of saving) 0.018 0.004 0.886 0.031 -0.010 0.874 
H 
(log of hours) 0.016 0.000 0.494 0.016 -0.006 0.631 
R 
(nominal int) 0.021 0.006 0.780 0.019 -0.001 0.711 D? 
(inflation) 0.038 0.015 0.256 0.032 0.006 0.117 
1. Cum.Corr is the correlation between the sum of forecast and actual outcomes over the entire period; since each cumulative 





Table 15: Rolling VAR Forecast, 2005-2010 
 Without Demographics With Demographics 
 cum.RMSE cum.RMSE 
Y 
(GDP growth) 0.152 0.150 
I 
(share of invest) 0.036 0.031 
S 
(share of saving) 0.057 0.059 
H 
(log of hours) 0.006 0.001 
R 
(nominal int) 0.044 0.029 D? 
(inflation) 0.072 0.027 





   40 
 
 
Table 16: Results for Growth, Investment and Savings 
 GDP growth (y) Share of investment (I) Share of savings (S) 
 Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| D?௧ିଵ 0.277*** 0.058 4.775 0.138* 0.041 3.366 -0.071** 0.051 0.062 D?௧ିଵ -0.310*** 0.116 2.672 0.929*** 0.072 12.903 0.056 0.082 0.683 D?௧ିଵ 0.084 0.074 1.135 0.048 0.038 1.263 0.954*** 0.057*** 16.737 D?௧ିଵ 0.027 0.015 1.800 -0.024 0.018 1.333 0.011* 0.041 0.268 D?௧ିଵ -0.225 0.101 2.228 -0.090 0.029 3.103 -0.052 0.051 1.020 D?௧ିଵ -0.063* 0.051 1.235 0.021 0.041 5.122 0.013 0.032 0.406 D?௧ିଶ 0.011*** 0.037 0.297 0.062*** 0.032 1.937 -0.047 0.042 1.119 D?௧ିଶ 0.059 0.011 5.364 -0.194 0.048 4.042 -0.203* 0.082** 2.476 D?௧ିଶ -0.065 0.060 1.083 -0.051 0.029 1.759 -0.210 0.075*** 2.800 D?௧ିଶ -0.009 0.065 0.138 0.047 0.035 1.343 -0.129* 0.040*** 3.225 D?௧ିଶ -0.062 0.012 5.167 -0.021 0.031 0.677 -0.064* 0.041 1.561 D?௧ିଶ -0.052* 0.014 3.714 -0.012* 0.041 0.293 0.020 0.022 0.909 D?D?D?D?௧ିଵ -0.019*** 0.014 1.357 0.003 0.000 2.717 -0.011 0.000** 2.245 D?D?D?D?௧ିଶ 0.021 0.015 0.140 0.001*** 0.000 1.988 0.001 0.000* 1.929 D?଴ -0.029 0.081 0.358 0.062* 0.041 1.512 -0.065** 0.072 0.903 D?ଵ 0.217 0.101 2.148 -0.040 0.051 0.784 0.139 0.052 2.673 D?ଶ 0.182 0.071 2.563 0.093* 0.030 3.100 0.020 0.063 0.317 D?ଷ -0.004* 0.006 0.667 -0.067** 0.041 1.634 0.102*** 0.083 1.229 D?ସ 0.040 0.082 0.488 0.010 0.040 0.250 0.124 0.073* 1.700 D?ହ 0.045 0.082 0.549 0.040 0.051 0.784 0.210* 0.010** 2.100 D?଺ -0.000 0.101 0.004 0.230 0.101 2.277 0.031 0.102 0.304 
 
         D?ଶ 0.29   0.79   0.70   ሺD?௝ ൌ  ?ሻ 0.000   0.00   0.000   
OBS 238   238   238   
1. The row for ሺD?௝ ൌ  ?ሻ reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation.  
2. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 17: Results for Hours, Interest Rate and Inflation 
 Log of hours (H) Nominal interest rate (R) Inflation (D?) 
 Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| Estimate Std. Err |t-stat| D?௧ିଵ 0.204*** 0.041 4.976 0.150 0.162 0.926 0.252*** 0.084 3.000 D?௧ିଵ 0.002 0.081 0.025 -0.195 0.168 1.161 -0.390** 0.170 2.294 D?௧ିଵ 0.064 0.040 1.600 0.006* 0.063 0.095 0.031 0.182 0.170 D?௧ିଵ 1.128*** 0.055 20.509 0.241*** 0.049 4.918 0.153* 0.072 2.100 D?௧ିଵ -0.140 0.032 4.375 0.033 0.378 0.087 -0.123*** 0.155 0.793 D?௧ିଵ 0.010 0.031 0.322 0.124 0.132 0.939 0.541* 0.227** 2.383 D?௧ିଶ 0.041 0.033 1.242 0.062* 0.034 1.823 0.133 0.083 1.602 D?௧ିଶ -0.083 0.091 0.912 0.209 0.206 1.015 0.573 0.408 1.404 D?௧ିଶ -0.062 0.039 1.589 -0.038 0.054 0.703 0.040 0.084 0.476 D?௧ିଶ -0.192*** 0.045 4.267 0.386* 0.214 1.800 -0.159 0.077** 2.467 D?௧ିଶ -0.002 0.032 0.062 0.383* 0.211 1.815 -0.048 0.122 0.393 D?௧ିଶ 0.021 0.040 0.525 -0.071** 0.031 2.290 0.019 0.047 0.404 D?D?D?D?௧ିଵ -0.010*** 0.003 3.333 -0.011 0.003 0.367 -0.018*** 0.002 9.000 D?D?D?D?௧ିଶ 0.010*** 0.003 3.333 0.001 0.003 0.333 0.018*** 0.012 1.500 D?଴ -0.010 0.073 0.136 0.161*** 0.011 14.636 0.460 0.017*** 27.059 D?ଵ -0.070 0.082 0.853 0.041 0.091 0.450 0.100 0.158 0.633 D?ଶ 0.060* 0.064 0.937 -0.040 0.061 0.656 -0.140 0.129 1.085 D?ଷ 0.090 0.065 1.384 -0.181 0.121 1.496 -0.450 0.210** 2.143 D?ସ 0.020 0.062 0.323 -0.090 0.110 0.818 -0.261 0.203 1.286 D?ହ 0.120 0.094 1.277 0.070 0.151 0.463 -0.041 0.211* 0.194 D?଺ 0.090 0.091 0.989 0.220* 0.131 1.679 0.181 0.293 0.618 
 
         D?ଶ 0.95   0.89   0.87   ሺD?௝ ൌ  ?ሻ 0.101   0.001   0.001   
OBS 238   238   238   
1. The row for ሺD?௝ ൌ  ?ሻ reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation.  
2. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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8.2 Figures 
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Figure 8: Age cohort impacts on inflation: OECD sub-periods  
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Figure 10: Age cohort impacts on inflation: refined age groups 
 
